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Abstract
Identity theft is one of the most profitable crimes committed by felons. In the cyber space, this is commonly
achieved using phishing. We propose here robust server side methodology to detect phishing attacks, called
phishGILLNET, which incorporates the power of natural language processing and machine learning techniques.
phishGILLNET is a multi-layered approach to detect phishing attacks. The first layer (phishGILLNET1) employs
Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (PLSA) to build a topic model. The topic model handles synonym (multiple
words with similar meaning), polysemy (words with multiple meanings), and other linguistic variations found in
phishing. Intentional misspelled words found in phishing are handled using Levenshtein editing and Google APIs
for correction. Based on term document frequency matrix as input PLSA finds phishing and non-phishing topics
using tempered expectation maximization. The performance of phishGILLNET1 is evaluated using PLSA fold in
technique and the classification is achieved using Fisher similarity. The second layer of phishGILLNET
(phishGILLNET2) employs AdaBoost to build a robust classifier. Using probability distributions of the best PLSA
topics as features the classifier is built using AdaBoost. The third layer (phishGILLNET3) further expands
phishGILLNET2 by building a classifier from labeled and unlabeled examples by employing Co-Training.
Experiments were conducted using one of the largest public corpus of email data containing 400,000 emails.
Results show that phishGILLNET3 outperforms state of the art phishing detection methods and achieves F-measure
of 100%. Moreover, phishGILLNET3 requires only a small percentage (10%) of data be annotated thus saving
significant time, labor, and avoiding errors incurred in human annotation.
Keywords: identity theft, machine learning, natural language processing, phishing, probabilistic latent semantic
analysis, boosting, co-training
1 Introduction
Stealing a person’s identity is one of the most profitable
crimes committed by criminals. Among 1.3 million com-
plaints received by the Federal Trade Commission in
2009, identity theft ranked first and accounted for 21% of
the complaints costing consumers over 1.7 billion US
dollars [1]. Identity theft has been around for many years
while the means of committing it has changed with tech-
nology. The traditional way criminals steal a person’s
identity is by killing the individual. Another way to steal
identity is using phone scams, where in, criminals inform
the person that they have won a sweepstake, and
convince the user to reveal some personal information to
claim the money. The more popular method of identity
theft that is prevalent even today is called Dumpster
Diving. When people discard letters, financial records,
and other personal information in the garbage dump
without shredding, criminals scavenge those dumps look-
ing for sensitive information such as credit card, bank
account social security numbers, and use that informa-
tion to commit crimes.
With the advent of Internet, the most popular way to
steal identity is through “phishing”. Like in traditional
fishing where fishermen trolls the river in a boat to catch
fish, in “phishing”, attackers trolls the Internet using
email message with convincing content as baits to steal
users personal information. The email directs the user
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via a hyperlink to a website owned by criminals that
looks very similar to a legitimate website. The user will
then be asked to enter personal and financial information
either to update existing information or to purchase a
product. In reality, this lets the criminal to have access to
that valuable information which they then use to commit
fraud or to sell it to a bidder. Phishers can also trick
users into downloading malicious codes or malware after
they click on a link embedded in the email. This is a use-
ful tool in crimes like economic espionage where sensi-
tive internal communications can be accessed and trade
secrets stolen. Phishing has been around since 1996 but
has become more common and more sophisticated.
Recent phishing attack on the Gmail system stole emails
of US government officials, contractors, and military
personnel [2].
Considerable research has been done towards protect-
ing users from phishing attacks. They include firewalls,
black listing certain domains and Internet protocol (IP)
addresses, spam filtering techniques, client side toolbars,
and user education. Each of these existing techniques has
some advantages and some disadvantages. For example,
existing filters have misclassification rates, the blacklist
approach is harder to maintain with every expanding IP
address/domain space, while the user ignores client side
toolbar warnings.
The main contribution of this research is a multi-layered
phishing detection method using previously developed
modeling techniques that includes topic modeling techni-
que Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (PLSA), classi-
fier ensemble technique AdaBoost and Co-Training
algorithm that employs labeled and unlabeled data. The
main goal of our novel approach is to detect phishing
before it gets to the user. Towards that goal, we have
developed the detection method, called phishGILLNET,
by incorporating the power of natural language processing
techniques. Similar to a “gillnet” that catches fish by its gill
thus preventing its movement once caught, phishGILL-
NET tries to catch phishing attacks by the tone, wordings,
and other linguistic variations in the content. By serving as
a server side filter, phishGILLNET prevents movement of
a phish towards the end user. The first layer of phishGILL-
NET (phishGILLNET1) employs PLSA to build a topic
model and uses a topic level similarity function for classifi-
cation. Unlike earlier approach that employed topic mod-
els, our model employed editing function and dictionary
lookups to specifically account for intentionally misspelled
words in phishing emails. The second layer of phishGILL-
NET (phishGILLNET2) employs classifier ensemble tech-
nique AdaBoost and topic probabilities as features to build
a robust classifier using several base learners. To further
expand phishGILLNET to handle labeled and unlabeled
email data, the third layer (phishGILLNET3) employs Co-
Training to build a classifier using topic distributions as
features and the best classification technique obtained in
the second layer. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
this is the first attempt that demonstrates the power of
topic model using Co-Training for phishing detection.
The size of the corpus we employed is significantly larger
(approximately 400,000) than that employed by authors of
the Co-Training technique (few thousands) as well as by
earlier researchers. Thus, our research is an additional
proof of concept of the Co-Training algorithm in employ-
ing unlabeled data.
This article is organized as follows. We first review the
state-of-the-art protection techniques and present their
advantages and disadvantages (see Section 2). The multi-
layered phishing detection method phishGILLNET is pre-
sented in Section 3. The modeling techniques employed
by phishGILLNET namely PLSA, AdaBoost, and Co-
Training are described in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
The experimental design is presented in Section 7. The
architectural components and results obtained on the pub-
lic corpus for each layer of phishGILLNET, namely, phish-
GILLNET1, phishGILLNET2, and phishGILLNET3, are
presented in Sections 8, 9, and 10, respectively. The per-
formance comparison with the state-of-the-art tools is
presented in Section 11. This article concludes with a dis-
cussion of the developed methodology and suggestions for
future research in Section 12.
2 Background
The primary motivation for attackers using phishing is to
steal identity from users. Several techniques have been
developed to protect users from phishing attacks. The
protection strategies are classified according to where in
the attack flow that strategy belongs (see Figure 1). In
Figure 1, the protection techniques are numbered 1-6
and shaded in grey. phishGILLNET is a server-side filter/
classifier (numbered 3 in Figure 1). Non-shaded ones are
the main components in the data flow. Some of the
detection tools and their advantages and disadvantages
are summarized in Table 1.
Network Level Protection
The network level protection is typically achieved by
blocking a range of IP addresses or a set of domains from
entering the network. DNSBL [3] is a database widely used
for this purpose by several Internet service providers. This
list is updated with new addresses, after observing for a
period of time abusive behavior. Hence, this approach is
reactive. Attackers evade this protection technique by
hijacking legitimate user’s PC and constantly moving from
one IP to another IP address. Snort [4] is an open source
software that is employed at network level. Rules to
enforce protection must constantly be manually updated.
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Kim and Huh [5] compared four different classification
techniques to detect DNS-poisoning-based phishing
attacks using routing information gathered over 1-week
period. Authors observed that k-nearest neighbor algo-
rithm achieved best results with a false positive rate of
0.7% and true positive rate of 99.4%.
Authentication
There are two levels of authentication: user level and
domain level. Typically, the email service provider
authenticates user, before he or she sends an email (user
level). The domain level authentication is performed in


























Figure 1 Phishing protection techniques.
Table 1 Phishing detection tools
Tool Type Description Advantages Disadvantages
Snort [4] Network
Level
Heuristic/rule engine Good at detecting level attacks Rules require manual adjustments. Does




Heuristic engine that uses
email specific features











Did not use content from body of the
email.




Plug-in to a browser Warns user if link points to
phish site.
Users do not pay attention to warnings.








Good results on small data sets.
Processing time is high. Susceptible to
screen resolution.
CallingID [32], CloudMark [33],






Good for domains that employ
domain level authentication.
Phish domains are short lived. Does not
look at email content.
eBay Account Guard[36] Client
Side
Tool
Utilizes blacklist of eBay
URLs
Protects eBay users. Specific website tool.





Adapts to user website visit
pattern.
Works only on internet explorer.
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to the other mail server). The user level authentication
is performed using password as credentials. The pass-
word authentication can easily be cracked as evidenced
by surge in phishing attacks. Microsoft has developed a
technology called Sender ID [6] while Yahoo has a simi-
lar technology called DomainKey [7]. Both these techni-
ques perform domain level authentication. In order for
these domain level techniques to work, providers on the
sender and the recipient side must implement the same
technology. Due to lack of agreement between email
providers, this technology is not that prevalent.
Server Side Filters and Classifiers
Server side filters and classifiers typically extract features
from the email and train a classifier to classify phishing
email versus non-phishing email. Classifiers can be
trained directly on various features extracted from the
data or by applying dimensionality reduction techniques
before training the classifier. Kim et al. [8] applied three
dimensionality reduction methods, namely, Centroid,
Orthogonal Centroid, and Linear Discriminant Analysis
and tested their effectiveness on three different classifiers:
Support Vector Machines, k-Nearest Neighbor, and
Centroid-based classification. Authors concluded that
dimension reduction techniques achieve high efficiency
without sacrificing prediction accuracy. SpamAssassin [9]
is a widely used host-level filter. This is a rule-based filter
that requires constantly changing for the rule to be effec-
tive. Attackers figure out the rule being employed and
bypass these filters by appropriately constructing the
email. PILFER [10] is another email classifier that is
trained using ten features extracted from email data.
Both these filters have high misclassification rates. Abu-
Nimeh et al. [11] presented a comparative evaluation of
classification techniques such as Logistic Regression,
Bayesian Adaptive Regression Trees, Support Vector
Machines, Random Forests, and Neural Network.
Authors trained the classifier using 43 features on a pri-
vate ham email and public phishing email data and
showed that random forest outperformed other classifiers
when weighted equally but resulted in worst false positive
rate. Neural network had the highest Area Under ROC
Curve. Later work by Abu-Nimeh et al. [12] developed a
method to detect phishing using Bayesian Additive
Regression Trees and obtained better prediction than
their earlier work. Miyamoto et al. [13] did a similar
comparison of machine learning techniques for phishing
website detection using about 3,000 website data. They
obtained F-measure of 0.85 using AdaBoost. Toolan and
Carthy [14] classified emails using C5.0 algorithm and
ensemble of different classifiers. Authors obtained an
F-measure of 99.31% using the publicly available dataset
(PhishingCorpus and SpamAssassin) of 8 K emails. Gan-
sterer and Pölz [15] developed a feature-based classifier
for ternary classification, spam versus phish versus good.
Authors utilized 11,000 phishing emails from a proprie-
tary data source and publicly available TREC corpus for
good and spam and obtained a classification accuracy of
97%. Bergholz et al. [16] trained a classifier using features
obtained using Dynamic Markov Chain and Class-Topic
Models. Authors obtained results better than PILFER on
the same public corpus and showed effectiveness of topic
features. Later work by Bergholz et al. [17,18] included
additional features such as identification of hidden salt-
ing, embedded logos and external links and evaluated on
a proprietary real life data from a commercial internet
provider of size 40 K. Toolan and Carthy [19] proposed
and ranked 40 different features using the information
gain criteria. Khonji et al. [20] did an evaluation of fea-
ture selection algorithms and feature subset search meth-
ods on the same public corpus that most of the other
research has been conducted. The study showed feature
subset of 21 heuristic features yielded F-measure of
99.39%. Al-Momani et al. [21] achieved classification
accuracy of 99.7% by applying a clustering algorithm for
phishing detection while Zhan and Thomas [22] obtained
a true positive rate of 99% by applying Stochastic Learn-
ing Weak Estimation approach. Yearwood et al. [23]
obtained profiles of phishing activity by solving the pro-
blem using a multi-class classification problem utilizing
features extracted from URLs in the emails. This study is
closely related to Bergholz et al. [16,17], in the sense that,
we use topic model PLSA (as compared to CLTOM) for
phishing detection. However, our topic model is built to
account for intentional misspelling and uses part-of-
speech (verbs, nouns, adjectives, and adverbs) to build
the model. We also show the effectiveness of our method
on a large corpus of unlabeled data using Co-Training.
Several research has been done for phishing website
detection. Xiang et al. [24] proposed a layered anti-phish-
ing approach for detecting phishing web sites. Authors
used a comprehensive feature-based detection algorithm
to detect and filter out non-login form web pages and
achieved 92% true positive rate and 0.4% false positive
rate. Khonji et al. [25] proposed a technique for detecting
phishing website by lexically analyzing URL tokens.
Authors evaluated 70 K phishing URLs and obtained clas-
sification accuracy of 97%. Zhang et al. [26] proposed a
text classifier, image classifier, and an algorithm that fused
the two-classifier results to detect phishing web page
detection and they concluded that fusion outperformed
the performance of individual classifiers. Hsu et al. [27]
proposed a solution for phish URL detection using suffix
tree clustering methodology while Khonji et al. [28] pro-
posed a heuristic solution. Wenyin et al. [29] developed an
approach to detect phishing target from the content of the
webpage. Most of the above research is limited to website
detection; however, we propose a generic content-based
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approach that can be applied to email, web pages, blogs,
and social networking posts.
Client Side Tools
Tools that operate on the client side (i.e., user’s machine)
include user profile filters and browser-based toolbars.
SpoofGuard [30], CatchingPhish [31], CallingID [32],
CloudMark [33], NetCraft [34], FirePhish [35], eBay tool-
bar [36], and IE Phishing Filter [37] are some of the client
side tools. User profile filters observe user’s website visit-
ing pattern and maintain a list of URLs in local database.
When a user visit’s a URL that is different from his/her
website visits, it warns the user with a dialog. Toolbars
are built and trained using the typical pattern of phishing
website URLs. Some patterns of phish website URLs
include IP address in the URL, long URLs, many dots in
the URL, etc. This technique is very susceptible to tech-
nology changes (such as IPV4 versus IPV6, tiny URLs)
and hence it is not robust. Moreover, most users do not
pay attention to the warning dialogs and hence it is not
an effective protection technique. Abu-Nimeh and Nair
[38] presented a new attack using DNS poisoning that
bypass the client side toolbars. Their evaluation of seven
tools concluded that none of them were able to detect
the attack there by making these tools ineffective. Jain
and Richariya [39] implemented a prototype web browser
to detect phishing URLs. Authors did not compare their
implementation with other browser-based tools and
hence the effectiveness of the tool is not clear. Lin et al.
[40] evaluated domain highlighting, the approach where
browser highlights the domain name in the address bar,
and concluded that this approach cannot be relied upon
solely to detect and prevent phishing attacks. Chen et al.
[41] presented a scientific assessment of user interface
design elements such as font type, color, message place-
ment, icon type, etc., used in various tools and concluded
that existing tools fail to consider preference of the user
while displaying warning and errors. Author’s findings
conclude that users prefer customization and personali-
zation of these tools. Felt and Wagner [42] examined the
threat of phishing on mobile devices. Authors analyzed
100 mobile applications and 85 web sites and found that
attackers can spoof mobile web site. Authors found that
Android and Apple-sponsored sites are top phish targets.
Prevent Against Duplication
This technique involves making the legitimate website
harder to reproduce. In all legitimate websites, the login
page is not protected. Hence, an attacker can easily
copy the code, styles, graphics, and HTML to create a
fake website. Hence, a protection approach could be to
make this copy harder. There is no earlier work done in
this area and hence it should be subject for future
research.
User Education
This involves educating the user about phishing attacks
and pattern of phish email. The basic mode of educating
user is posting help pages in websites and warning the
user about phishing. MailFrontier [43] has setup a website
containing screenshots of several phish emails. Robila and
Ragucci [44] evaluated the effect of user education in
differentiating phishing and good emails. The authors pre-
sented a lecture on how to identify phishing emails and
the harm of falling for a phish in an introduction to com-
puting class. At the end of the lecture, the authors pre-
sented student with both phishing and good emails.
Students were then asked to identify the email type. The
study concluded that students identified phishing emails
correctly after the lecture. Students also acknowledged the
usefulness of the lecture. Similar study was also conducted
at the Indiana University [45]. Arachchilage and Cole [46]
designed an educational mobile game for home computers
to protect users from phishing attacks. The game was
designed to educate users to recognize phishing URLs.
Authors developed a prototype simulator using Google
App Inventor Emulator. Tseng et al. [47] also designed a
game to educate users about phishing based on the con-
tent of the website. Moore and Clayton [48] conducted a
study of how attackers discover potential hosts for phish-
ing websites and concluded that search engine as one pri-
mary source. Authors of the study concluded public
disclosure of phishing sites, such as the one done by
phishtank.com, significantly reduces host compromise by
attackers.
Existing protection techniques are ineffective in stopping
the phishing attacks from reaching the end user. Network
level protection using domain and IP address blacklisting
require periodic updates and are reactive in nature as list
can be updated only after observing abuse pattern for
some time period. Moreover, attackers can compromise
legitimate user’s machine to conduct phishing attacks and
hence blacklisting may block legitimate user from using
the web. Existing server side filters and classifiers result in
misclassification and use feature sets that are susceptible
to technology changes. The classifiers that use content for
attack detection do not consider intentionally misspelled,
conjoined, and disjointed words. Attackers make subtle
changes to the text of the email by using different words
at different times and by using misspelled words to avoid
detection by filters that require an exact word match.
Thus, these filters often fail to detect phishing emails. Cli-
ent side tools and filters expose the user one step closer to
the attack. As users do not pay attention to warning dia-
logs, they end up falling for phishing attacks. The goal of
this research is to stop the attack before it reaches the
user. This is accomplished by building a robust multi-
layered content-driven phishing detection methodology,
phishGILLNET, which is described in Section 3.
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3 phishGILLNET methodology
A schematic representation of phishGILLNET is shown
in Figure 2. Gillnetting is a common fishing method used
by fishermen in the ocean and in some freshwater areas
[49]. A “gillnet”, as the name implies, is a net that catches
a fish by its “gill”. It is a layer of netting hung vertically in
the water by a float line on the top and a weighted line at
the bottom. The mesh size, depth, and length of gillnet
are determined by the species of fish that fishermen is
trying to catch. The net allows the head of the fish to
pass through but not its body. When the fish attempts to
pass through, it gets stuck in the net by its gill and could
neither move forward nor backward. Just like a gillnet is
used to catch a fish by its gill, phishGILLNET is used to
catch phishing attacks based on the linguistic variation in
the content.
phishGILLNET is a multi-layered methodology for
detecting phishing attacks (Figure 3). Just like gillnet
comes in various mesh sizes, the mesh size of the first
layer of phishGILLNET (phishGILLNET1) is larger than
the second layer (phishGILLNET2) and the second layer
(phishGILLNET2) is larger than the third layer (phish-
GILLNET3). Phishing attacks missed by phishGILLNET1
are caught by phishGILLNET2 and the ones missed by
phishGILLNET2 are caught by phishGILLNET3. All
three layers of phishGILLNET employ PLSA (see Section
4) to build a topic model that discovers phishing topics
and non-phishing topics. phishGILLNET1 performs clas-
sification on unseen data using Fisher similarity function.
phishGILNET2 builds a finer mesh utilizing PLSA topic
features and AdaBoost (see Section 5). By employing
PLSA, AdaBoost, and Co-Training (see Section 6), phish-
GILLNET3 further expands detection capability by build-
ing robust classifier from labeled and unlabeled data.
In order to build PLSA topic model, which all three
layers of phishGILLNET employs, the methodology
requires preparation of Term Document Frequency
(TDF) matrix. Figure 4 shows the main components to
build TDF, namely, Parser and TDF Matrix Builder.
Both these components are described below:
Parser
Raw email data are typically present in Multipart Inter-
net Mail Extension (MIME) format. phishGILLNET uti-
lizes words and hyperlinks present in the body of the
email to build PLSA model. Parser consists of the
following:
MIME Parser
Parses email MIME message and extracts email headers
and email body. Email body is further separated into
HTML body part and text body part. For emails con-
taining only text MIME part, the parser extracts text
and hyperlinks. In a phishing email, these hyperlinks
link to the phishing website.
HTML Parser
MIME message-containing HTML body part is included
as multipart/html part in the email body part. When the
MIME parser detects a HTML part, it invokes the
HTML parser to separate out text, style-sheets, hyper-
links, and scripts. For the purpose of building PLSA
model, both text and hyperlinks are considered.
Tokenizer
This tokenizes text present in email body and hyperlinks
into separate words. Tokenizer utilizes white space (tabs,
space, new lines) as token delimiters for the text. The hyper-
links are tokenized after replacing all non-alphanumeric
characters with space.
TDF Matrix Builder
A term-document matrix describes the frequency of
terms that occur in a collection of documents. The rows
of the matrix correspond to document (di) in the collec-
tion and the columns correspond to terms (wj) that pre-
sent in those documents. For the text part, the terms wj
belong to one of the part-of-speech tags (adjectives,
adverbs, nouns, and verbs). For the hyperlinks part, all
terms are used to build TDF. The matrix entries n(di, wj)
denote the number of times word wj occurs in document
Attacker Phishing Server phishGILLNET User 
Figure 2 phishGILLNET.
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di. Prior to building TDF Matrix, the following pre-pro-
cessing steps must be accomplished.
Stop Words Removal
Stops words are words that do not contain important
significance for building the model. Some example stop
words include the, at, like, etc. We remove stop words
from all the tokenized email text.
Stemming
Stemming is a method for removing inflexional endings
from certain words. For example, word “consigned”,
after stemming becomes “consign”. Porter’s Stemming
[50] algorithm is employed to stem words in email body.
Dictionary Lookup
WordNet [51] dictionary is employed to lookup words
in dictionary. WorldNet database has Part-of-Speech
(POS) extractor. It identifies verbs, nouns, adverbs, and
adjectives. Words found in WorldNet database forms
part of the input for building TDF matrix using text.
For the hyperlinks TDF, WordNet lookup and spell
checker is skipped.
Spell Checker
Attackers intentionally misspell words in a phishing
email to avoid detection by standard spam filters. For
words that are not found in WordNet database, Google’s
spell check API [52] is utilized to retrieve words that are
similar to the misspelled word.
Levenshtein Distance
Levenshtein distance [53] is a metric for measuring the
amount by which two words differ. The metric is also
called edit distance. It is the minimum edit operations
required to transform one word to another. The edit
operations include insertion, deletion, and substitution of
a new character. In a phish email, there are misspelled
Phishing 
Email 




(PLSA + AdaBoost) 
phishGILLNET3 
(PLSA + AdaBoost + 
Co-Training) 
TDF 
Figure 3 Multi-layered phishGILLNET.
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words, which after edit operation is found in dictionary.
Examples include “vuln’a’rability”, “youaccounts”, etc.
Also, there are terms made of garbage characters that are
never found in dictionary. We consider only misspelled
words that can be corrected after certain edit operation.
After obtaining the suggested words using Google API,
Levenshtein distance is computed. Only those words
whose edit distance is less than some configured thresh-
old (default value of 5) are further included for building
TDF matrix.
Build TDF Matrix
For email body text, using words, (specifically adjectives,
adverbs, nouns, and verbs), that found directly in diction-
ary and edited words using Levenshtein’ edit operation,
the term-document-frequency matrix is created. For
email hyperlinks, all terms are used to build TDF matrix.
Thus, phishGILLNET accounts for misspelled words,
conjoined words, and POS tags present in email body
before building the TDF matrix. Once the TDF matrix
is built using components described above, all three
layers of phishGILLNET employs PLSA to build the
topic model for phishing detection. The PLSA modeling
technique is described in the following section.
4 PLSA
PLSA is a technique for topic discovery proposed by
Hofmann [54,55]. The technique is closely related to
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA). While LSA is based on
the foundations of linear algebra to perform a Singular
Value Decomposition of co-occurrence tables, PLSA is a
statistical method that defines a latent class model to
perform probabilistic mixture decomposition. PLSA
handles both synonyms, different words with similar
meanings, and polysemy, words whose meaning changes
according to context. PLSA has been applied in the field
of information retrieval, natural language processing,
machine learning, and image processing.
Model
The PLSA model maps the high-dimensional vector of
words of a document to a lower dimensional vector of
topics. The PLSA modeling is shown in Figure 5. Sup-
pose we have a collection of documents, di Î {d1, d2,...,
di}, and a set of words that occur in those documents wj
Î { w1, w2,...,wJ}. PLSA then associates a latent topic vari-
able zk Î {z1, z2,...,zK} with the occurrence of each word
in a particular document. PLSA assumes conditional
independence, such that words and documents are con-
ditionally independent for a given topic. Thus, the PLSA
model for the word-document co-occurrence can be











































Figure 4 Parser and TDF matrix builder.
Ramanathan and Wechsler EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2012, 2012:1
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/1
Page 8 of 22
where, P(di) is the probability that a word will be
observed in a given document di, P(wj|zk) is the prob-
ability of a particular word conditioned on latent topic
variable zk, P(zk|di) is the probability distribution of spe-
cific document over the latent variable space, and K is
the number of topics. The probability P(wj|zk) corre-
sponds to words that make up a given topic while the
probability P(zk|di) corresponds to topics that a given
document belong to. Unlike traditional cluster algorithm
wherein a document may belong to just one cluster,
PLSA gives the probabilities with which a given docu-
ment may belong to one or more topics.
Expectation Maximization (EM) Algorithm
The model parameters P(wj|zk) and P(zk|di) are esti-
mated by maximizing the data log-likelihood using EM













The M-Step obtained by maximizing the expected














The model parameters are estimated by iteratively
alternating the E-Step and the M-Step until some
desired termination criteria is satisfied. Stopping criteria
may include no measurable difference in the log-likeli-
hood between successive iterations or the maximum
number of iterations.
TEM Algorithm
In order for the PLSA model to generalize well on
“new” (unseen) documents, Hofmann [54,55] proposed a
modified EM algorithm for PLSA called TEM algorithm.
TEM is closely based on deterministic annealing. In
TEM, a control parameter b is introduced in the E-step







In the above expression, substituting b with value of 1
yields the E-step of standard EM algorithm. The main
advantage of the TEM algorithm over the standard EM
algorithm is that TEM avoids model over-fitting. The
optimal value of b is obtained by starting with a value
of 1, evaluate the performance of EM on a held-out
dataset, decrease the value of b, and check if the perfor-
mance improves. The iterative procedure is stopped









































Figure 5 PLSA model.
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Folding-In
When a new (unseen) document is given, to compute the
probability distribution of topic(s) that new documents
belong to, a folding-in technique is employed. In PLSA,
this is achieved by keeping the distribution of words that
make up a topic (P(wj|zk)) fixed while the distribution of
topics that new document belong to (P(zk|dnew)) is adapted
at each M-step. The distribution P(wj|zk) is obtained dur-
ing the training phase of PLSA. The E-Step of the EM





and for the M-Step, P(wj|zk) is obtained from the
training phase. The distribution of topics to new docu-







The folding-in technique yields the probability distribution
of new (unseen) documents belonging to one or more
topics (P(zk|dnew)). Given a training set of labeled samples,
belonging to one or more categories, the category of the
new unlabeled document is obtained using a similarity
function. After obtaining probability estimates using fold-
in, to categorize new documents to a specific category,
similarity scores between new documents and documents
in the training set are computed. The category of the docu-
ment in the training set that yields the highest similarity
score is the category of the new document. A commonly
used similarity function is the Euclidean distance function.
However, the Euclidean distance is not a good metric for
computing similarity between two probability distributions.
Hofmann [54,55] derived the following Fisher-Kernel func-
tions for the generative statistical PLSA model. The kernel
consists of two components. The Kernel function due to





The above kernel function computes the overlap
between topics and thus captures words with similar
meanings and words that belong to the same topic. The
contribution due to word to topic probability distribu-









In the above kernel function K2, words with multiple
meanings (polysemy) contribute to the similarity score.
The PLSA technique described above is applied to all
the layers of phishGILLNET. The classification in phish-
GILLNET1 is achieved using the Fisher similarity func-
tion described here.
5 AdaBoost
The classification using similarity function is an efficient
technique but not as robust as employing classification
technique. To cope with data variability, one employs clas-
sifier ensemble. The idea behind classifier ensemble is to
combine predictions of multiple classifiers and produce a
single classifier. The prediction result from the combined
classifier is generally better than that of individual classi-
fiers. Results from an ensemble are less dependent on
strangeness of employing a single training set and thus it
reduces bias and variance. There are several ways of form-
ing an ensemble or a collection. The two most popular
ones are bagging and boosting. Both these methods rely
on re-sampling of the data to obtain different training sets
for each of the classifiers. Here, we employ the boosting
technique, specifically, AdaBoost.
The idea behind AdaBoost, developed by Freund and
Schapire [56], is to produce a series of classifiers. The
training data used for each member of the series is chosen
based on the performance of earlier classifiers in the series.
Incorrectly predicted examples are selected more fre-
quently than correctly predicted examples. Thus, boosting
produces classifiers that are better in prediction that the
current ensemble. Unlike bagging, AdaBoost considers
performance of the earlier classifiers. The algorithm is
detailed as follows:
Given input training data (x1, y1), (x2, y2),....,(xm, ym),
where xi belongs to feature space X and yi belongs to
label set Y = {-1, +1},
Step 0: Initialize weights for the first iteration, D1(i) =
1/m
For iteration index t = 1,...,T, where T is the number
of iterations,
Step 1: Train a weak learner using distribution Dt.
Step 2: Obtain weak hypothesis
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where Zt is the normalization factor.
The final strong classifier, which is a weighted major-







phishGILLNET2 employs AdaBoost using several
learning algorithms such as C4.5 decision trees [57],
rule-based classifier RIPPER [58], random forest [59],
support vector machines [60], and logistic regression
[61] to build a robust classifier. The features to build
the classifier are the topic distribution probabilities
obtained from the PLSA model.
6 Co-Training
One of the major problems in building a classifier is the
non-availability of labeled data. A classification task for
phishing detection requires labeled phish examples and
non-phish examples. While there are many data sources
for obtaining general spam emails and good emails, there
is very few labeled phishing email public corpus. As phish-
ing emails and general spam emails share similar charac-
teristics, human annotation result in incorrect labeling and
hence the available corpus may not be perfect. Co-Train-
ing is an algorithm to solve this non-availability problem.
The algorithm is proposed by Blum and Mitchell [62], for
the problem of semi-supervised learning where there are
both labeled and unlabeled examples. The goal of Co-
Training is to enhance performance of learning algorithm
when only a small set of labeled examples is available. The
algorithm trains two classifiers separately on two sufficient
and redundant views of the examples and lets the two
classifiers label unlabeled examples for each other. The
assumptions of the algorithm are that each view is condi-
tionally independent given the class label and that each
view is sufficient on its own for the purpose of classifica-
tion. The algorithm works as follows: Given a set of
labeled training instances (L) and a set of unlabeled
instances (U), select u instances randomly from U to cre-
ate a smaller pool U’. Iterate for k iterations the following
steps:
• Split each instance x, and build two views x1 and x2.
• Use the training set L to build a classifier h1 using
x1.
• Use the training set L to build a classifier h2 using
x2.
• Label p positive and n negative instances from U’
using the classifier h1.
• Label p positive and n negative instances from U’
using the classifier h2.
• Add labeled instances to the training set L.
• Select 2 x (p + n) instances from unlabeled set U
and to add it pool U’.
The idea behind the Co-Training algorithm is that the
classifier h1 adds examples to the labeled set which are in
turn used by the classifier h2 in the next iteration and
vice versa. This process should make classifiers h1 and h2
to agree with each other after several iterations. Blum
and Mitchell [62] validated the Co-Training algorithm
using 1,051 web page data where x1 consisted of words
that appeared on the web page and x2 consisted of words
in all the hyper links that pointed to the web page.
Nigam and Ghani [63] proposed a variant to the Co-
Training called Co-EM algorithm. The Co-EM algorithm
is not incremental in nature and it labels all unlabeled
data at each iteration. Furthermore, only the data labeled
by one classifier are used by the other classifier and vice
versa. Co-Training was applied to email domain by Kir-
itchenko and Matwin [64]. Authors used Co-Training to
classify interesting versus uninteresting email. Chan et al.
[65] demonstrated Co-Training for spam classification on
a corpus of 2,883 emails. Wan [66] applied Co-Training
to cross-lingual sentiment classification. Kumar and
Daumé [67] extended Co-Training to unsupervised spec-
tral clustering algorithm where in clusters identified in
one view is used to label data in other view so as to mod-
ify the graph structure.
Here, we propose to utilize Co-Training to evaluate the
effectiveness of topic model to classify phishing on a large
corpus of labeled and unlabeled data. phishGILLNET3
employs Co-Training to build classifiers on two views of
the data, namely text view and hyperlink view, starting
with small labeled sample and pool of unlabeled samples,
and iteratively build a robust classifier for phishing detec-
tion. The experimental design including the datasets
employed, data preparation, training and test strategies,
and performance measures, is described in the following
section.
7 Experimental design
In this section, we present the details on experiments
designed to build and evaluate phishGILLNET. This
includes datasets employed, data preparation, training and
test strategies, and measures to evaluate performance.
7.1 Datasets
Four publicly available email datasets and one publicly
available phish URL dataset were used to evaluate phish-
GILLNET. Email datasets include (i) ham (good) emails
from SpamAssassin corpus [68], (ii) phishing emails
from the PhishingCorpus [69], (iii) good emails from
Enron Email Dataset [70], and (iv) spam emails from
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SPAM Archive [71]. Phish URL dataset includes (v)
PhishTank [72].
(i) SpamAssassin [68]
SpamAssassin corpus contains a total of 6,047 messages,
of which, 4,150 messages are good and the remaining are
spam. These messages were collected by the SpamAssassin
project for the years 2002-2003 and made available to the
research community. For evaluation in this study, spam
messages are not used (only 4,150 good messages are used
instead).
(ii) PhishingCorpus [69]
PhishingCorpus contains 4,550 phishing emails. These
emails were collected by an individual for the period
2004-2007 and donated to the research community. For
evaluation, all the phishing emails from this corpus were
used.
(iii) Enron Email Dataset [70]
This dataset contains data from about 150 senior manage-
ment people of Enron that was made public by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission during its investigation.
This dataset contains approximately 500,000 emails. Out
of the Enron emails, we employed 136,226 emails from
the inbox and sent folder of the mailbox, thus ensuring
only good emails from this corpus.
(iv) SPAM Archive [71]
SPAM archive contains spam emails collected by Bruce
Guenter [71] using various bait accounts since 1998. We
used all spam emails of January 2011 through November
2011. This accounted for 336,070 emails thus size of the
total corpus was 470,000 (approximately). SPAM archive
does not distinguish between “spam” and “phishing”
emails. Thus, it is an ideal dataset to evaluate the architec-
ture using Co-Training, which is a semi-supervised algo-
rithm that employs labeled and unlabeled data.
(v) PhishTank [72]
PhishTank URLs are manually verified by human experts
that it is a confirmed phish attack. We collected 48,000
phish URLs from phishtank.com for the year 2011.
7.2 Data preparation
Two sets of public dataset combinations were used to
build and evaluate the PLSA model. The first set of experi-
ments (combination1) employed datasets (i) & (ii) while
the second set of experiments (combination2) employed
(iii) & (iv). The first set is a much smaller public corpus
than the second set. In combination1, there are a total of
8,700 messages, 4,550 phishing, and 4,150 good emails.
While in combination1 all emails are labeled, the combi-
nation2, specifically (iv), does not distinguish between
phishing and spam emails. In order to compute misclassi-
fication errors, phishing emails in SPAM archive were seg-
regated using the following semi automated approach.
Hyperlinks in emails were extracted using a HTML parser.
SURBL [73] provides a reputation lookup service for
domains that are confirmed phish hosting domains. By
using a combination of phishtank.com URLs and domain
reputation data from SURBL, if a match is found for the
SURBL domains or phishtank URL in the hyperlinks pre-
sent in an email, then that email is labeled as a “phish”
email. This resulted in phish emails of 47,783 out of
336,070 spam emails. Thus, the distribution of emails in
combination2 is 10% phish, 61% spam, and 29% good.
According to the Internet Security Threat Report 2010
from Symantec [74], that collected and analyzed billions of
emails from 2009, in a realistic mail system, 85-90% of all
emails are spam and 5-10% of all spam emails are phish.
Thus, to have realistic distribution of data in combina-
tion2, our experiments were conducted with 10% phish,
80% spam, and 10% good emails. Thus, the size of the cor-
pus used for combination2 is 400,000 emails, which is 10
times the size of corpus used by Bergholz et al. [17] and
one of the largest email corpus used for phishing detec-
tion. Also, we used public corpus and hence our results
can be reproduced.
All the messages were parsed using a MIME parser to
separate email headers from email body. Multipart mes-
sages containing HTML parts were further parsed using
a HTML parser to extract the body text and hyperlinks.
Both MIME and HTML parsers were written in this
study using Java programming language. For evaluation,
only messages that contain body text and hyperlinks
were considered. Thus, messages that failed parser and
attachments were not included for building models.
7.3 Training and testing
Experiments were conducted using k-fold cross-validation
strategy with a k value of 10. Thus, 90% of the dataset was
used during training and 10% of the dataset was used for
testing. In order to build the PLSA model, the training
data are further split into 90% for building the topic model
and 10% for computing perplexity, thus, independent data-
sets for training, computing perplexity, and testing. The
TDF matrix builder (see Section 3) is used to build the
term-document matrix for each set. The topic distribution
probabilities on the test set is derived using PLSA fold-in
(see Section 4). Classification in phishGILLNET1 (see Sec-
tion 8) is achieved using Fisher similarity function while
phishGILLNET2 (see Section 9) employs AdaBoost and
phishGILLNET3 employs AdaBoost and Co-Training (see
Section 10).
7.4 Performance evaluation metrics
The quality of the PLSA model is evaluated using two
measures of performance, namely, log-likelihood and
perplexity. The training dataset is split into a set for
building the model (training data) and a set (held out)
for validating the model using these performance
measures.
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Log Likelihood
The log likelihood on the training dataset can be com-








Perplexity, a measure of uncertainty in natural language
models, gives a better assessment of how well the model
generalizes on unseen (new) data. The lower the per-
plexity, the better the generalization and hence the clas-
sification. Perplexity for a PLSA model is defined by
Hofmann [54,55] as follows










where n(dh, wj) is the number of times the word wj
occurs in held out document dh and P(wj|dh) is the
probability that word wj occurs in document dh. One
can see that classification is proportional to the number
of topics.
The classification performance is measured using the
following standard measures of performance, namely,
Precision, Recall, F-measure, and Area under the ROC
Curve (AUC). They are defined as follows

















2 ∗ (precision × Recall)
(precision + Recall)
where TP is number of true positive, FP is number of
false positive, and FN is number of false negative. ROC
curve is a plot of true positive rate versus false positive
rate. The two-dimensional depiction of classifier perfor-
mance in a ROC curve is reduced to single scalar value
representing expected performance by computing the
AUC. The AUC of a classifier is equal to the probability
that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen positive
example higher than the randomly chosen negative
example.
Experiments conducted using publicly available data-
sets and performance of each layer of phishGILLNET
are reported in the following sections.
8 phishGILLNET1
phishGILLNET1 is the top layer of the multi-layered
phishing detection methodology. It employs PLSA topic
modeling technique to discover phishing and non-phish-
ing topics and Fisher similarity function for classification.
The architecture of phishGILLNET1 and experimental
results are reported in this section.
8.1 Architecture
The architecture of phishGILLNET1 is shown in Figure 6.
The architecture has four main components: parser, TDF
matrix builder, PLSA model trainer, PLSA fold-in and
Classifier. The architecture employs the parser to parse
data and TDF matrix builder to build the TDF matrix
(described in Section 3). It employs the PLSA modeling
technique (described in Section 4) to build the topic
model.
PLSA Model Trainer
The input to the model is the TDF matrix of the training
dataset. In this study, TEM algorithm described earlier in
Section 4 was employed to build the topic model. PLSA
algorithm is implemented using Java programming
language.
Initialization
PLSA requires number of topics, K, to be specified at
initialization similar to cluster analysis. The probability
distributions are initialized using random numbers.
E-Step
The joint probability distribution values are computed
using initialized probability distribution.
M-Step
In the M-step, word-topic and topic-document probabil-
ities are computed using expressions given in PLSA
model section.
Compute Performance Metric
Performance measure, log likelihood, and perplexity are
computed according to the equations given in the
experimental design section (see Section 7).
PLSA Fold-In
In fold-in, test data probability distributions are com-
puted using the P(w|z) value from the training phase as
input. The TEM algorithm is employed to compute dis-
tributions on the test data set, while P(w|z) is kept fixed.
Classifier
phishGILLNET1 categorizes email as phishing versus
non-phishing using a similarity function. Using labeled
emails as input dataset, containing phishing emails and
non-phishing emails, topic distribution probabilities and
word distribution probabilities are obtained by building
a PLSA model. The similarity score is computed using
Fisher Kernel similarity function between test emails
and emails in the training set. The label of the training
email that yields the highest similarity score is consid-
ered the label of the test email.
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8.2 Results
Experiments were conducted using two combinations of
datasets, combination1 containing 8 K emails and combi-
nation2 containing 400 K emails (see Section 7). Experi-
ments were repeated on two machines (i) Mac OS X
(10.6.5), 2.66 GHz Intel Core i7, 4 GB RAM and (ii) Cent
OS (linux 2.6.18), 1.99 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo, 4 GB RAM.
The average computation time is measured and reported
here. For phishing detection, PLSA model consisting of
phishing and non-phishing topics is first developed. Parsed
email data are used to build the TDF matrix. After various
pre-processing steps, that includes tokenization, stop
words removal, and porter’s stemming, the POS tags are
extracted using WordNet [51]. We further observed phish-
ing emails contained intentionally misspelled words, such
as, “verificacion”, “verifcation”, and conjoined words such
as “yourchasebank”, “yourpaypal”. Words that were not
found in WordNet direct lookup were further processed
using Google’s suggestion API [52] and Levenshtein [53]
editing function. If the edit distance is within the threshold
value of 5 and if the second lookup in WordNet suc-
ceeded, those words were added to build the TDF matrix.
The TEM algorithm, detailed in Section 4, is employed
to build the PLSA model. The number of topics, K, chosen
for evaluation includes values ranging from 2 to 200. The
maximum number of TEM iterations for convergence was
set to 500. The annealing parameter b was initialized to
value of 1.0 and decremented in increments of 0.25 to see
if performance improves on the held out dataset.
Results from the PLSA model training and model eva-
luation are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 and Figure 7.
In Table 2 the word-to-topic distribution probabilities of
top 12 words for two topics (a phishing topic and a non-
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Figure 6 phishGILLNET1 architecture.
Table 2 phishGILLNET1–PLSA word/topic probability
distribution
Topic (z) (phishing) Topic (z) (non-phishing)
Word (w) Probability P(w|z) Word (w) Probability P(w|z)
Bank 0.058 Ocean 0.024
Online 0.046 Honolulu 0.014
Banking 0.033 Imminent 0.013
America 0.032 Assuring 0.010
Account 0.021 Handsome 0.009
Update 0.019 Builder 0.007
Security 0.017 Lush 0.005
Customer 0.014 Lousy 0.005
Below 0.013 Roads 0.005
Link 0.013 Vantage 0.005
Click 0.011 Sweetness 0.005
Please 0.011 Wine 0.004
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which words make up a phishing topic and which words
make up a good topic. Two methods of evaluating the
performance of a PLSA model, log likelihood on the
training data and perplexity on the held out, were used.
A model that yields lowest log-likelihood on the training
data is considered the best model. The number of EM
steps was varied from 1 to 350. The plot obtained for the
(number of topics) K value of 10 topics on combination1
datasets is shown in Figure 7. As it can be seen from the
figure, the negative log-likelihood (see Section 7) drops
steeply until EM iterations of 15 and drops gradually
after that indicating (almost) convergence and triggering
the stopping criteria. The log-likelihood is not a good
measure for model generalization. The model with the
lowest perplexity is the one that generalizes well for clas-
sifying new/unseen data. In order to evaluate perfor-
mance on held out data, the number of topics was varied
from K = 2 to K = 200. As it can be seen from Table 3 on
the dataset combination1, the perplexity for a K value of
10 yielded 278 and did not change significantly for higher
values of K. On the dataset combination2, a K value of
200 yielded 1,475 and did not change significantly for
values larger than 200. The PLSA models were then eval-
uated for classification performance on test data. This
requires computation of topic/document probability dis-
tributions on test data. This is achieved using the PLSA’s
folding-in technique where the TEM algorithm is
employed by keeping the word/topic probability distribu-
tions fixed. The Fisher similarity score was then com-
puted between each test data and training data. The label
of the training data that yields the highest similarity score
is the label of the test data. It can be seen from Table 4
that the PLSA model yielded F-measure of 98.3% on
dataset combination1 and 98.1% on dataset combina-
tion2. Results on the large public corpus of 400 K emails
show the robustness of phishGILLNET1 for phishing
detection. A K value of 200 yielded the best F-measure
and lowest false positive on dataset combination2. One
can see (Table 4) that performance is almost perfect for
K value of 200 and both precision and F-measure are
very close to 1. The corresponding computation time
(average on two machines) on 200 topic model on dataset
combination2 is approximately 3 h.
In order to compare the performance of phishGILL-
NET1 with that of support vector machines, the TDF
matrix of dataset combination2 was utilized. To build the
SVM classifier, first the dimensionality reduction techni-
que, Principal Component Analysis, was applied to TDF
for computation reasons. In addition, features were
selected by applying the information gain criteria. WEKA
software using the libSVM library was used to build the
SVM classifier. Results from SVM with feature selection
are reported in Table 5. It can be seen that SVM results
(F-measure of 95.9%) are worse than phishGILLNET1
(F-measure of 98.1%). In addition, SVM took close to 9 h
to train, whereas phishGILLNET1 using 200 topics took
approximately 3 h.
9 phishGILLNET2
phishGILLNET2 is a finer layer than phishGILLNET1.
Instead of using Fisher similarity function for categoriza-
tion using topic distribution probabilities, AdaBoost is
employed to build a robust classifier using PLSA topic
distribution probabilities as feature. Furthermore,
Table 3 phishGILLNET1–PLSA model performance
Number of topics Dataset combination1 (8 K public corpus) Dataset combination2 (400 K public corpus)
Perplexity Computation time (min) Perplexity Computation time (min)
2 523.56 1.65 6742.42 32.31
10 278.81 2.52 4441.96 45.20
25 277.62 3.12 1748.55 52.00
50 274.31 3.63 1593.10 65.00
100 273.33 7.42 1461.78 112.50
200 271.27 15.38 1425.36 185.20
Table 4 phishGILLNET1–classification performance
Number of topics Dataset combination1 (8 K public corpus) Dataset combination2 (400 K public corpus)
FPR Precision F-measure FPR Precision F-measure
2 0.02 0.977 0.975 0.025 0.971 0.970
10 0.00 0.983 0.983 0.014 0.976 0.976
25 0.00 0.983 0.983 0.010 0.977 0.977
50 0.00 0.983 0.983 0.009 0.981 0.980
100 0.00 0.983 0.983 0.004 0.981 0.981
200 0.00 0.983 0.983 0.001 0.981 0.981
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phishGILLNET2 performs 3-class classification (phish,
spam, good) as well as binary classification (phish, not
phish). The architecture of phishGILLNET2 and experi-
mental results are reported next.
9.1 Architecture
The architecture of phishGILLNET2 is shown in Figure 8.
phishGILLNET2 employs AdaBoost as the classifier
ensemble. The PLSA topics are discovered as before in
phishGILLNET1 and topic distribution probabilities on
training data are estimated. AdaBoost classifier ensemble
is built using these probabilities as features and several
weak learners. Existing classification techniques such as
C4.5 decision tree, rule based-classifier (RIPPER), random
forest, support vector machines, and logistic regression are
used as the weak learners in phishGILLNET2. The perfor-
mance of the classifier is compared using the metrics
reported in Section 7. The open source software WEKA
was used for the implementation of phishGILLNET2.
9.2 Results
Experiments were conducted on the public dataset combi-
nation2. The total email corpus of 400,000 emails was
used for validating this architecture (40,000 phish, 40,000
good, and 320,000 spam). Experiments were conducted
using k-fold cross validation, with a k value of 10. Thus,
for each trial, 90% of the emails were used for training and
10% were used for testing. PLSA topic models were built
for number of topics (K) 50, 100, and 200. Each model
thus results in corresponding number of topic distribution
probabilities (features) 50, 100, and 200, respectively. Clas-
sifiers were then built using these features and AdaBoost
algorithm. Experiments were conducted on two machines
(i) Mac OS X (10.6.5), 2.66 GHz Intel Core i7, 4-GB RAM
and (ii) Cent OS (linux 2.6.18), 1.99 GHz Intel Core 2
Duo, 4-GB RAM. The average computation times are
measured and reported here. The computation times
reported here are the times to perform the cross-validation
after extraction of topic features. Time to build the PLSA
models is reported in Section 8.
Results from the experiments are presented in Tables 6
and 7. Only top five performing classifier results are pre-
sented here. The classification performance is reported in
Table 6 for 3-class classification and Table 7 for binary
classification. For the 3-class problem, boosting with the
random forest technique as the base learner yielded the
Figure 7 phishGILLNET1 performance–log likelihood versus number of EM steps.
Table 5 Classification performance of SVM on dataset
combination2






0.14 0.963 0.959 530
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best precision and best F-measure of 97.7% for a K value
of 200. For the 2-class problem, boosting using the logis-
tic regression base learner yielded the best precision and
F-measure of 99.7% for k value of 200. Thus, for the bin-
ary classification phishGILLNET2 resulted in better F-
measure (99.7%) compared to phishGILLNET1 (F-
measure 98.1%). Boosting using random forest technique
yielded 99.5% for the same number of topics in phish-
GILLNET2. Random forest is computationally faster than
most of the other techniques that were evaluated. Results
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Figure 8 phishGILLNET2 architecture.
Table 6 phishGILLNET2–3-Class (phish versus spam versus good) classification performance
Topics Weak learner for boosting TPR FPR Precision Recall F-measure ROC Area Time (s)
50 C4.5 0.954 0.088 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.944 1.84
50 RIPPER 0.964 0.069 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.955 12.07
50 Random forest 0.974 0.079 0.973 0.974 0.973 0.996 3.09
50 SVM 0.91 0.199 0.907 0.91 0.908 0.867 12.41
50 Logistic 0.909 0.238 0.905 0.909 0.905 0.957 2.42
100 C4.5 0.967 0.068 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.961 5.06
100 RIPPER 0.974 0.043 0.975 0.974 0.975 0.971 16.6
100 Random forest 0.976 0.075 0.975 0.976 0.975 0.997 3.31
100 SVM 0.964 0.095 0.964 0.964 0.963 0.94 11.32
100 Logistic 0.971 0.065 0.97 0.971 0.97 0.989 5.05
200 C4.5 0.969 0.061 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.961 8.93
200 RIPPER 0.972 0.048 0.973 0.972 0.972 0.968 24.77
200 Random forest 0.977 0.06 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.996 3.7
200 SVM 0.97 0.071 0.971 0.97 0.97 0.953 18.62
200 Logistic 0.971 0.065 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.989 6.15
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10 phishGILLNET3
phishGILLNET3 is the third layer of the multi-layered
phishGILLNET. This layer employs AdaBoost and Co-
Training algorithm to build a robust classifier using
large corpus of unlabeled data. Labeling data to build
classifiers require significant time and human labor.
phishGILLNET3 eliminates the need for fully labeled
corpus. The architecture and experimental results are
reported next.
10.1 Architecture
The architecture of phishGILLNET3 is shown in Figure 9.
The motivation for this implementation is to evaluate the
robustness of topic model, specifically PLSA, on a large
corpus of unlabeled data. This architecture implements
the Co-Training algorithm and applies to the email
domain. The algorithm starts with small corpus of labeled
emails (phishing and non-phishing). Using parser compo-
nents (see Section 3), email data are parsed into text pre-
sent in the body of the email and hyper links. The text and
hyper links form two views for applying the Co-Training
algorithm. One of the assumptions behind the Co-Train-
ing algorithm is that the two views should not be perfectly
co-related. In a phishing email, the text in body of the
email will contain enticing content asking the user to click
the hyperlink and the hyperlink and accompanying web
content will contain the impersonating entity. There may
be some correlation between the two views (body text and
Table 7 phishGILLNET2–binary (phish versus not phish) classification performance
Topics Weak learner for boosting TPR FPR Precision Recall F-measure ROC Area Time (s)
50 C4.5 0.985 0.055 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.966 0.79
50 RIPPER 0.989 0.051 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.968 4.17
50 Random forest 0.993 0.053 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.999 1.31
50 SVM 0.939 0.355 0.935 0.939 0.937 0.792 12.67
50 Logistic 0.938 0.421 0.932 0.938 0.933 0.957 1.0
100 C4.5 0.995 0.02 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.987 1.58
100 RIPPER 0.997 0.012 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.993 6.82
100 Random forest 0.994 0.052 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.999 2.32
100 SVM 0.992 0.069 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.961 10.55
100 Logistic 0.995 0.023 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.994 2.17
200 C4.5 0.996 0.019 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.991 2.51
200 RIPPER 0.994 0.024 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.987 7.85
200 Random forest 0.995 0.037 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.999 2.87
200 SVM 0.988 0.098 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.945 10.78
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hyperlinks) but not perfect correlation. In addition, review
of literature (see Section 2) shows that classifiers built just
using hyperlinks and just using body text yields good clas-
sification performance. Hence, we apply co-training to the
email body text and hyperlink views. For the body text, all
words in the email are used to build the PLSA model for
text view. For the hyperlinks, terms are extracted by repla-
cing all non-alphanumeric characters as token separator in
the hyperlinks. These terms are used to build the PLSA
model for the hyperlink view.
For both views, once the PLSA model is built, the topic
distribution probabilities are extracted as features. These
features are used to build the classifier. The text classifier
and the hyperlink classifier classify unlabeled email data
and most confidently predicted email data are added to
labeled corpus for the next iteration of co-training. The
process repeats until there is no more unlabeled data to
label.
10.2 Results
Experiments were conducted using the dataset combina-
tion2. Experiments were repeated on two machines to
measure the computation time. Of the total corpus of
400 K, 10% of the data (40 K) was used as labeled data (L)
for the first iteration of the Co-Training algorithm. The
parameters that yielded the best performance in phish-
GILLNET2 are employed to build phishGILLNET3. This
implies that number of topics K is 200 and the weak lear-
ner for the AdaBoost is logistic regression (see Table 7).
The parameters of the Co-Training algorithm are p
(phish) = 200 and n (not phish) = 1800. This unbalanced
dataset is realistic with proportion of phishing emails in
large-scale mail systems. The size of the unlabeled pool U’
is 5000. After each iterations of Co-Training, the text view
classifier labels 2,000 emails and the hyperlink view labels
2,000 emails resulting in 4,000 additional labeled data for
the next iteration of Co-Training. The pool U’ is replen-
ished by selecting 4,000 additional emails randomly from
the unlabeled set U.
Results from the Co-Training algorithm of the combined
hyper link and text classifiers are tabulated in Table 8.
After ten iterations of Co-Training, it is evident that phish-
GILLNET3 results in better performance than phishGILL-
NET2 (99.8% as compared 99.7%). More iterations of the
algorithm resulted in an F-measure 100%. Results show the
robustness of PLSA, AdaBoost, and Co-Training algorithm
to detect phishing. Moreover, phishGILLNET3 achieves
superior performance using 10% of the labeled data thus
saving time, effort, and errors associated with human
annotation.
11 Performance comparison
The performance of phishing detection architecture,
phishGILLNET, is compared with state-of-the-art
research that attempted to solve phishing detection. Per-
formance of each layer of phishGILLNET was compared
with ten different published researches ranging from year
2007 to 2011. Comparison was also performed using sup-
port vector machines using words (instead of topic prob-
abilities) as features. In Table 9 we show characteristics
of our work and the state-of-the-art research. The corpus
used by phishGILLNET is exclusively public where as in
the state-of-the-art six of them have used public, two pri-
vate, and the other two mix of private and public. phish-
GILLNET has used the largest public corpus of size 400
K emails. Thus, results from phishGILLNET are repeata-
ble. The corpus used by phishGILLNET is ten times
more than the next [17] in terms of size. Thus, phish-
GILLNET demonstrates the scalability aspect. The most
recent public corpus (year 2011) is used by phishGILL-
NET for evaluation. phishGILLNET2 supports both 3-
class (phish, spam, good) and binary (phish, not-phish)
classification. The only method that performs 3-class
classification is that of Gansterer and Pölz [15]. All the
others perform binary classification. phishGILLNET3 is
the only method that handles unlabeled data. This is the
most powerful feature and important contribution of
phishGILLNET. To the best of authors’ knowledge, there
is no other study that applied Co-Training for phishing
detection and certainly not at this scale. The closest
research study is by Chan et al. [65] who applied Co-
Training for spam classification on a small dataset of
2,883 emails.
Results of phishGILLNET comparing the state-of-the-
art research are tabulated in Tables 10 and 11. The perfor-
mance metric that is compared is the F-measure (for bin-
ary classification) and accuracy (for 3-class classification).
On the 3-class classification (see Table 10), the compari-
son of phishGILLNET2 with the study of Gansterer and
Pölz [15] on the accuracy metric shows that phishGILL-
NET2 resulted in a better performance (97.7%) compared
with the best result obtained by Gansterer and Pölz [15].








5 0.997 0.014 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.987
10 0.998 0.015 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.99
15 0.999 0.014 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.989
20 1.0 0.012 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.991
25 1.0 0.012 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.991
30 1.0 0.013 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.991
35 1.0 0.015 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.991
40 1.0 0.009 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.993
45 1.0 0.0009 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.999
(PLSA 200 topics + AdaBoost with logistic regression weak learner + Co-
Training)
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Thus, topic features using AdaBoost are robust for 3-class
classification.
For the binary classification, of the ten state-of-the-art
researches, only seven of them reported F-measure
results. It is evident from the results in Table 11 that
phishGILLNET3 resulted in an F-measure of 100%.
phishGILLNET3 is the top ranked method followed by
Bergholz et al. [17], which reported an F-measure of
99.89%. Thus, it is evident that the PLSA, AdaBoost,
and Co-Training algorithm employed by phishGILL-
NET3 significantly boosts performance. Moreover,
phishGILLNET3 has the additional advantage of not
requiring 100% labeled samples thus saving significant
manual work. Not relying heavily on manual annotation
also has the advantage of the method being less prone
to human error and disagreement, as one may consider
a spam email as good email and vice versa. Thus, phish-
GILLNET3 is not only superior on F-measure, but also
has these additional advantages. phishGILLNET2, that
employed AdaBoost classifier and did not employ Co-
Training, came close third with an F-measure of 99.70.
However, phishGILLNET2 required fully labeled sam-
ples unlike phishGILLNET3. Another interesting obser-
vation is the top four of the top ten methods employed
topic features for building classifiers. While the second
and fourth ranked methods utilized features in addition
to topic features, phishGILLNET utilized exclusively
topic features. Thus, results from the top four methods
prove the robustness of using topic features for phishing
classification.
12 Conclusions
A multi-layered methodology, called phishGILLNET, is
proposed and evaluated for phishing detection. All three
layers of phishGILLNET employ PLSA to discover phish-
ing and non-phishing topics. phishGILLNET1 categorizes
unseen data using Fisher similarity. phishGILLNET2
employs AdaBoost using PLSA topic features and builds
a better classifier than phishGILLNET1. phishGILLNET3
builds a robust classifier using only a fraction of labeled
samples and applying Co-Training to label additional
samples. The novelty of this architecture comes from
employing semantic features to build the detection
model. Intentional misspelled words found in phishing
are handled using Levenshtein editing and Google APIs
for correction before building the TDF matrix. One of
the important contributions of this article is the use of
Co-Training on a large corpus of unlabeled data to detect
phishing attacks.
The architecture developed is compared with ten state-
of-the-art methods. The performance of phishGILLNET3
is better than all the other competing methods and
achieves an F-measure of 100%. Evaluation of phishGILL-
NET3 is done on a very large dataset (400 K emails)













Chan et al. [65] 2004 Public 2.8 K NA No Yes
PILFER [10] 2007 Public 7.8 K 2002-2006 No No
Abu-Nimeh et al.
[11]
2007 Private 2.8 K 2005-2006 No No
Bergholz et al. [16] 2008 Public 8 K 2004-2007 No No
Abu-Nimeh et al.
[12]
2009 Mix 6.5 K 2006-2007 No No
Gansterer and
Pölz [15]
2009 Mix 15 K 2007 Yes No
Toolan and Carthy
[19]
2010 Public 8.3 K 2004-2007 No No
Bergholz et al. [17] 2010 Private 40 K 2007 No No
Khonji et al. [20] 2011 Public 8.2 K 2003-2007 No No
Al-Momani et al.
[21]
2011 Public 8.7 K 2003-2007 No No
phishGILLNET1 - Public 8.7 K 2003-2007 No No
phishGILLNET2 - Public 400 K 2011 (phish-40 K, spam 320 K) Yes No
2001 (good-40 K)
phiahGILLNET3 - Public 400 K 2011 (phish-40 K, spam-320 K) No Yes
2001 (good-40 K)
Table 10 Performance comparison–3-class classification
Method Accuracy (%) Rank
phishGILLNET2 97.70 1
Gansterer and Pölz [15] 97.00 2
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compared to other competing methods. Moreover, the
corpus used is publicly available and hence experiments
could be reproduced. phishGILLNET3 also has the power-
ful feature of incorporating unlabeled data during training.
phishGILLNET is domain neural. It can be employed to
detect phishing attacks at social networking posts (Face-
book, Twitter, etc.), instant messages, chat, blog posts, etc.
As long as the content is available in text, MIME and
HTML formats, this architecture can handle all of them.
Thus, phishGILLNET is a significant research contribution
to detect phishing attacks.
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